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Abstract 23 24
Decision-making biases can be systematic features of normal behaviour, or deficits underlying 25 neuropsychiatric symptoms. We used behavioural psychophysics, spiking-circuit modelling and 26 pharmacological manipulations to explore decision-making biases in health and disease. Monkeys 27 performed an evidence integration task in which they showed a pro-variance bias (PVB): a preference 28
to choose options with more variable evidence. The PVB was also present in a spiking circuit model, 29
revealing a neural mechanism for this behaviour. Because NMDA receptor (NMDA-R) hypofunction is 30 a leading hypothesis for neuropathology in schizophrenia, we simulated behavioural effects of NMDA-31 R hypofunction onto either excitatory or inhibitory neurons in the model. These were tested 32 experimentally using the NMDA-R antagonist ketamine, yielding changes in decision-making 33 consistent with lowered cortical excitation/inhibition balance from NMDA-R hypofunction onto 34 excitatory neurons. These results provide a circuit-level mechanism that bridges across explanatory 35 scales, from the synaptic to the behavioural, in neuropsychiatric disorders where decision-making 36 biases are prominent. 37
Significance 38 39
People can make apparently irrational decisions because of underlying features in their decision 40 circuitry. Deficits in the same neural circuits may also underlie debilitating cognitive symptoms of 41 neuropsychiatric patients. Here, we reveal a neural circuit mechanism explaining an irrationality 42 frequently observed in healthy humans making binary choices -the pro-variance bias. Our circuit 43 model could be perturbed by introducing deficits in either excitatory or inhibitory neuron function. 44
These two perturbations made specific, dissociable predictions for the types of irrational decision-45 making behaviour produced. We used the NMDA-R antagonist ketamine, an experimental model for 46 schizophrenia, to test if these predictions were relevant to neuropsychiatric pathophysiology. The 47 results were consistent with impaired excitatory neuron function, providing important new insights into 48 the pathophysiology of schizophrenia. 49 Introduction 61 62
Schizophrenia is a debilitating neuropsychiatric disorder, associated with prominent deficits in 63 cognitive function [1] [2] [3] . Despite being the focus of intensive research, the neural bases of its 64 symptomatology remain poorly understood. Our current understanding of the pathophysiology of 65 schizophrenia mainly focuses on disruptions at the synaptic level. One line of investigations implicates 66 N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor (NMDA-R) dysfunction 4-6 , and NMDA-R antagonists have been used 67 as a pharmacological model of schizophrenia. When administered to healthy volunteers, they 68 transiently reproduce multiple aspects of the symptoms of schizophrenia, especially cognitive deficits 7-69 9 . One interpretation of these observations is that NMDA-R hypofunction causes an imbalance of 70 excitation and inhibition in cortical circuits 5, 10, 11 . However, linking these pathophysiological 71 mechanisms to the cognitive impairment observed in patients has proved challenging. 72
One difficulty is to carefully isolate which cognitive computations underlie neuropsychiatric symptoms. 73 Working memory deficits in patients with schizophrenia have been well-characterised, which has 74 facilitated preclinical research providing insights into potential pathophysiological mechanisms 2,12 . 75 However, whether these working memory deficits reflect a more general impairment in other 76 temporally extended cognitive processes in the symptomatology of schizophrenia remains an open 77 question. One closely related cognitive process is evidence accumulation -the decision process 78
whereby multiple samples of information are combined over time to form a categorical choice 13 . It has 79 been extensively studied using the random-dot motion (RDM) task, where subjects must decide the 80 net direction of a moving dots stimulus 13, 14 . Patients with schizophrenia have impaired perceptual 81 discrimination on the RDM task [15] [16] [17] , but the precise nature of this decision-making deficit is unclear. 82
Previous studies have attributed it to an impaired representation of the sensory evidence in visual 83 cortex 15, 18 , yet circuit-level alterations affecting visual cortex are likely also present in downstream 84 cortical association areas involved in evidence accumulation and decision-making. It is therefore 85 important to characterise precisely whether and how the underlying process of evidence accumulation 86 may be affected in schizophrenia. 87
Recent research has advanced our understanding of how such evidence accumulation decisions are 88 made in the healthy brain. Of particular relevance to psychiatric research, it has been possible to 89 disentangle systematic biases in decision-making and reveal the mechanisms through which they 90 occur. For instance, when choosing between two series of bars with distinct heights, people have a 91 preference to choose the option where evidence is more broadly distributed across 92 samples 19, 20 . Although this "pro-variance bias" may appear irrational, and would not be captured by 93 many normative decision-making models, it becomes the optimal strategy when the accumulation 94 process is contaminated by noise 19 . These behaviours have presently been well-characterised using 95 algorithmic level descriptions of decision formation. By extending this approach to psychiatric 96 research, new insights could be gained into the decision making deficits in schizophrenia. However, in 97 order to understand how these decision biases might be affected by NMDA-R hypofunction, a more 98 mechanistic explanation is needed. 99
An influential technique used to investigate evidence accumulation at the mechanistic level has been 100 biophysically grounded computational modelling of cortical circuits [21] [22] [23] . Through strong recurrent 101 connections between similarly tuned pyramidal neurons, and NMDA-R mediated synaptic 102 transmission, these circuits can facilitate the integration of evidence across long timescales. Crucially, 103 these neural circuit models bridge synaptic and behavioural levels of understanding, by predicting 104 both choices and their underlying neural activity. These predictions reproduce key experimental 105 phenomena, mirroring the behavioural and neurophysiological data recorded from macaque monkeys 106 performing the RDM task 21, 24 . Whether neural circuit models can provide a mechanistic 107 implementation of the pro-variance bias, and other irrational aspects of evidence accumulation, is 108 currently unknown. Circuit models also present a promising avenue to address the challenges of 109 neuropsychiatric research due to their biophysically detailed mechanisms. By perturbing the circuit 110 model at the synaptic level, specific behavioural and neural predictions can be made. Relevant to 111 schizophrenia, NMDA-R hypofunction can be introduced to alter the balance between excitation and 112 inhibition (E/I balance) 25 . Recent studies have used NMDA-R antagonists to validate model 113 predictions during working memory tasks 25, 26 . While NMDA-R antagonists have been tested during  114  various decision-making tasks 27,28 , the role of the NMDA-R in shaping the temporal process of  115  evidence accumulation has not been characterised experimentally.  116 Here we used a psychophysical behavioural task in macaque monkeys, in combination with spiking 117 cortical circuit modelling and pharmacological manipulations, to gain new insights into decision-118 making biases in both health and disease. We trained two subjects to perform a challenging decision-119 making task requiring the combination of multiple samples of information with distinct magnitudes. 120
Replicating observations from humans, monkeys showed a pro-variance bias. The pro-variance bias 121 was also present in the spiking circuit model, revealing an explanation of how it may arise through 122 neural dynamics. We then investigated the effects of NMDA-R hypofunction in the circuit model, by 123 perturbing NMDA-R function at distinct synaptic sites. Perturbations could either raise or lower the E/I 124 ratio, with each effect making dissociable predictions for evidence accumulation behaviour. These 125 model predictions were tested experimentally by administering monkeys with a subanaesthetic dose 126 of the NMDA-R antagonist ketamine (0.5mg/kg, intramuscular injection). Ketamine produced decision-127 making deficits consistent with a lowering of the cortical E/I ratio. 128
Results

131
To study evidence accumulation behaviour in non-human primates, we developed a novel two-132 alternative perceptual decision-making task (Fig1a Stimuli  162  presented at a time point with a larger regression coefficient have a strong impact on the choice,  163 relative to time points with smaller coefficients. We found that the subjects utilised all eight stimuli 164 throughout the trial to inform their decision, and demonstrated a primacy bias such that early stimuli 165 have stronger temporal weights than later stimuli . A primacy bias has been reported in prior 166 studies in monkeys, and is consistent with a decision-making strategy of bounded evidence 167 integration [29] [30] [31] . As it was clear both monkeys could accurately perform the task, all subsequent figures 168 are presented with data collapsed across subjects for conciseness, but results separated by subjects 169 are consistent (Supplementary Material). 
185
Subjects were significantly more accurate on chi = 99.05, ). Errorbars 186 indicate the standard error. (C) Preference for the broad option on 'Ambiguous' trials. Subjects were significantly more likely to 187 choose the broad option (Binomial test, ). (D-E) Human choice performance on Narrow-Broad trials previously 188 reported by Tsetsos et al. 2012 20 . (D) Choice accuracy when either the narrow or the broad stream is correct, respectively.
189
Subjects were more accurate on 'Broad-correct' trials. (E) Preference for the broad option on 'Ambiguous' trials. Subjects were 190 more likely to choose the broad option.
191
We next probed the influence of evidence variability on choice. We designed specific choice options 192 with different levels of standard deviation across samples in an attempt to replicate the pro-variance 193 bias previously reported for human subjects (see Methods) 19, 20 . On each trial, one option was 194 allocated a narrow distribution of bar heights, and the other a broad distribution. In different 195 conditions, either the broad or narrow stimuli stream could be the correct choice ('Broad Correct' 196 Trials or 'Narrow Correct' Trials) , or there could be no clear correct answer ('Ambiguous' Trials) 197 (Fig3a, Supplementary Fig. 1 ). If subjects chose optimally, and only the mean bar height influenced 198 their choice, their accuracy would be the same in 'Broad Correct' and 'Narrow Correct' trials and they 199 would be indifferent to the variance of the distributions in 'Ambiguous' trials. We show that our 200 monkeys deviate from such behaviours. The monkeys are more accurate on 'Broad Correct' trials 201 than on 'Narrow Correct' trials (Fig3b, Supplementary Fig. 1 ). Furthermore, in the 'Ambiguous' trials, 202
the monkeys demonstrated a preference for the broadly distributed stream, which has greater 203 variability across samples (Fig3c, Supplementary Fig. 1) . Such a pro-variance bias pattern of 204 decision behaviour is similar to what was found in human subjects 19, . 205
206
To further probe the pro-variance bias, we studied choices from a larger pool of 'Regular' trials in 207 which the mean evidences and variabilities of the two streams were set independently on each trial 208 (Fig4a, b, Supplementary Fig. 2) . 'Regular' trials allowed us to explore the pro-variance bias across 209 a greater range of choice difficulties (Fig4c) and quantitatively characterise its effect using regression 210 analysis. On 'Regular' trials, subjects also demonstrated a preference for options with broadly 211 distributed evidence. Regression analysis confirmed that evidence variability was a significant 212 predictor of choice (Fig4d; see Methods). In addition, we defined the pro-variance bias (PVB) index 213
as the ratio of the regression coefficient for evidence standard deviation over the regression 214 coefficient for mean evidence. This acted as a unitless measure of the pro-variance bias over the 215 subjects' sensitivity to the net evidence for choice selectivity. A PVB index value of 0 thereby indicates 216 no pro-variance bias, whereas a PVB index value of 1 indicates the subject is as sensitive to evidence 217 standard deviation as they are to mean evidence. The PVB index thus provides a quantitative 218 measure of the pro-variance bias. From the 'Regular' trials, the PVB index across both monkeys was Recent work has suggested that when traditional evidence accumulation tasks are performed, it is 237 hard to dissociate whether subjects are combining information across samples, or whether 238 conventional analyses may be disguising a simpler heuristic 32,33 . In particular, an alternative decision-239 making strategy which does not involve temporal accumulation of evidence is to detect the single 240 most extreme sample. Because the extreme sample will occur at different times in each trial, if a 241 subject employed this strategy, the choice regression weights across time points would be distributed 242 as in Fig2c,d. Therefore, it is possible for these findings to be mistakenly interpreted as reflecting 243 evidence accumulation. We wanted to quantitatively confirm that subjects were using the strategy we 244 envisioned when designing our task, namely evidence accumulation. Additionally, we wanted to 245 further investigate the relative contributions of mean evidence and evidence variability on choices. A 246 logistic regression approach probed the influence upon choice of mean evidence, evidence variability, 247 first/last samples, and the most extreme samples within each stream (Supplementary Fig. 2e ,h, see 248
Methods). A cross-validation approach revealed choice was principally driven by the mean evidence, 249
verifying that subjects performed the task using evidence accumulation ( Supplementary Table 1 , see 250
Methods). 251
Although this analysis revealed choices were not primarily driven by an 'extreme sample detection' 252 decision strategy, another concern was whether partially employing this strategy could explain the 253 pro-variance effect we observed. To address this, we compared the influence of 'evidence variability' 254 versus the influence of 'extreme samples' on subjects' choices. Cross-validation revealed that choices 255
were better described by a model incorporating evidence variability, rather than the extreme sample 256 values ( Supplementary Table 2 ). We also demonstrated that including evidence variability as a co-257
regressor improved the performance of all combinations of nested models ( Supplementary Table 3 ).
258
In summary, it can be concluded that although subjects integrated across samples, they were 259 additionally influenced by sample variability. 
285
Existing algorithmic-level proposals for generating a pro-variance bias in human decision-making rely 286
on the disregarding of sensory information before it enters the accumulation process, depending on 287 its salience 19 . To investigate a possible alternative basis for the pro-variance bias, at the level of 288 neural implementation, we sought to characterise decision-making behaviour in a biophysically-289
plausible spiking cortical circuit model (Fig5a, b, Supplementary Fig. 3 ) 21, 34 . In the circuit 290 architecture, two groups of excitatory pyramidal neurons are assigned to the left and right options, 291 such that high activity in one group signals the response to the respective option. Excitatory neurons 292 within each group are recurrently connected to each other via AMPA and NMDA receptors, and this 293 recurrent excitation supports ramping activity and evidence accumulation. Both groups of excitatory 294 neurons are jointly connected to a group of inhibitory interneurons, resulting in feedback inhibition and 295
winner-take-all competition 21, 22 . The two groups of excitatory neurons receive separate inputs -with 296 each group receiving information about one of the two options (i.e. Group A receives I A reflecting the 297 left option; Group B receives I B reflecting the right option). Specifically, we assume the bar heights 298 from each stream are remapped, upstream of the simulated decision-making circuit, to evidence for 299 the corresponding option depending on the cued context. Therefore, higher bars correspond to larger 300 inputs in 'ChooseHigh' trials and smaller inputs in 'ChooseLow' trials. Combined together, this 301 synaptic architecture endows the circuit model with decision-making functions. 302 303
The spiking circuit model was tested with the same trial types as the monkey experiment. Importantly, 304 not only can the circuit model perform the evidence accumulation task, it also demonstrated a pro-305 variance bias comparable to the monkeys (Fig5c-f). Regression analysis showed that the circuit 306 model utilises a strategy similar to the monkeys to solve the decision-making task ( Supplementary  307  Fig. 3b ). The temporal process of evidence integration in the circuit model disproportionately 308
weighted early stimuli over late stimuli (Fig5g), similar to the evidence integration patterns observed 309 in both monkeys. However, the circuit model demonstrated an initial ramp-up in stimuli weights due to 310 the time needed for it to reach an integrative state. 311 312 313 
327
To understand the origin of the pro-variance bias in the spiking circuit, we mathematically reduced the 328 circuit model to a mean-field model (Fig6a), which demonstrated similar decision-making behaviour to 329 the spiking circuit (Fig6b, c, Supplementary Fig. 4) . The mean-field model, with two variables 330
representing the integrated evidence for the two choices, allowed phase-plane analysis to further 331 investigate the pro-variance bias. A simplified case was considered where the broad and narrow 332 streams have the same mean evidence, and the stimuli evidence varies over time in the broad stream 333 but not the narrow stream (i.e. σ =0) (Fig6e-h). This example provides an intuitive explanation for the 334 pro-variance bias: a momentarily strong stimulus has an asymmetrically greater influence upon the 335 decision-making process than a momentarily weak stimulus. It can be shown that such asymmetry 336 arises from the expansive non-linearities of the firing rate profiles (Fig6d Fig. 5b) . In 372 addition, the temporal weightings were distinctly altered by the elevated-and lowered-E/I 373 perturbations (Fig7i To explore these predictions experimentally, we collected behavioural data from both monkeys 392
following the administration of a subanaesthetic dose (0.5mg/kg, intramuscular injection) of the 393 NMDA-R antagonist ketamine (see Methods, Fig8, Supplementary Fig. 6) . After a baseline period of 394 the subjects performing the task, either ketamine or saline was injected intramuscularly (Monkey A:  395 13 saline sessions, 15 ketamine sessions; Monkey H: 17 saline sessions, 18 ketamine sessions). 396
Administering ketamine had behavioural effects for around 30 minutes in both subjects. The data 397 collected during this period formed a behavioural database of 4142 completed trials (Monkey A: 2276; 398
Monkey H: 1866). Following ketamine administration, subjects' choice accuracy was markedly 399
decreased (Fig8a), without a significant shift in their strategies (Supplementary Fig. 6,  400 Supplementary Table 4 ). To understand the nature of this deficit, we studied the effect of drug 401 administration on the pro-variance bias (Fig8b-f) . Although subjects were less accurate following 402 ketamine injection, they retained a pro-variance bias (Fig8c) . Regression analysis confirmed 403 ketamine caused choices to be substantially less driven by mean evidence (Fig8d) , but still strongly 404 influenced by the standard deviation of evidence across samples (Fig8e). The PVB index was 405 significantly higher when ketamine was administered, than saline (permutation test p = 8x10 -6 , Fig8f).
406
Of all the circuit model perturbations, this was only consistent with lowered E/I balance (Fig7h). 407
Finally, we investigated the effect of ketamine on the time course of evidence weighting (Fig8g) . It 408 caused a general downward shift of the temporal weights; but had no strong effects on how each 409 stimulus was weighted relative to the others in the stream. This shifting of the weights could reflect a 410 sensory deficit, but given the results of the pro-variance analysis, collectively the behavioural effects 411 of ketamine are most consistent with a lowering of E/I balance. 412 figure. (B, C) The psychometric function when either the 417 'Lower SD' or 'Higher SD' streams are correct, with saline (B) Previous studies have shown human participants exhibit choice irrationalities when options differ in 430 the standard deviation of the evidence samples, preferring choice options drawn from a more variable 431 distribution 19, 20 . By utilising a behavioural task with precise experimenter control over the distributions 432 of time-varying evidence, we show that macaque monkeys exhibit a similar pro-variance irrationality in 433 their choices akin to human participants. This pro-variance bias was also present in a spiking circuit 434 model, which demonstrated a neural mechanism for this behaviour. We then introduced perturbations 435 at distinct synaptic sites of the circuit, which revealed dissociable predictions for the effects of NMDA-436 R antagonism. Ketamine produced decision-making deficits consistent with a lowering of the cortical 437 excitation-inhibition balance. 438
Biophysically grounded neural circuit modelling is a powerful tool to link cellular level observations to 439 behaviour. Previous studies have shown recurrent cortical circuit models reproduce normative 440 decision-making and working memory behaviour, and replicate the corresponding neurophysiological 441 activity [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] 35 . However, whether they are also capable of reproducing idiosyncratic cognitive biases 442
has not previously been explored. Here we demonstrated pro-variance and primacy biases in a 443 spiking circuit model. The primacy bias results from the formation of attractor states before all of the 444 evidence has been presented. This neural implementation for bounded evidence accumulation 445 corresponds with previous algorithmic explanations 29 . 446
The results from our spiking circuit modelling also provided a parsimonious explanation for the cause 447 of the pro-variance bias within the evidence accumulation process. Specifically, strong evidence in 448 favour of an option pushes the network towards an attractor state more so than symmetrically weak 449 evidence pushes it away. In contrast, previous explanations for pro-variance bias proposed 450 computations at the level of sensory processing upstream of evidence accumulation. In particular, a 451
'selective integration' model proposed that information for the momentarily weaker option is discarded 452 before it enters the evidence accumulation process 19 . Crucially, our circuit model generated 453
dissociable predictions for the effects of NMDA-R hypofunction on the pro-variance bias (PVB) index 454 that were tested by follow-up ketamine experiments. While it is still unclear where and how in the 455 brain the selective integration process takes place, our modelling results suggest that purely sensory 456 deficits may not capture the alterations in choice behaviour observed under ketamine, in contrast to 457 E/I perturbations in decision-making circuits (Fig7h). Multiple complementary processes may 458 simultaneously contribute to pro-variance bias during decision making, especially in complex 459 behaviours over longer timescales. Future work will aim to contrast between these two models with 460 neurophysiological data recorded while monkeys are performing this task. 461
Our pharmacological intervention experimentally verified the significance of NMDA-R function for 462 decision-making. In the spiking circuit model, NMDA-Rs expressed on pyramidal cells are necessary 463 for reverberatory excitation, without which evidence cannot be accumulated and stable working 464 memory activity cannot be maintained. NMDA-Rs on interneurons are necessary for maintaining 465 background inhibition and preventing the circuit from reaching an attractor state prematurely 21, 25 . By 466 administering ketamine, an NMDA-R antagonist, specific short-term deficits in choice behaviour were 467 induced, which were consistent with a lowering of the cortical excitation-inhibition balance in the 468 circuit model. This suggests the NMDA-R antagonist we administered systemically was primarily 469 acting to inhibit neurotransmission onto pyramidal cells. 470
The physiological effects of NMDA-R antagonism on in vivo cortical circuits remains an unresolved 471 question. A number of studies have proposed a net cortical disinhibition through NMDA-R 472 hypofunction on inhibitory interneurons 4,10,11,36 . The disinhibition hypothesis is supported by studies 473
finding NMDA-R antagonists mediate an increase in the firing of prefrontal cortical neurons, in 474 rodents 37,38 and monkeys [39] [40] [41] [42] . On the other hand, the effects of NMDA-R antagonists on E/I balance 475 may vary across neuronal sub-circuits within a brain area. For instance, in a working memory task, 476
ketamine was found to increase spiking activity of response-selective cells, but decrease activity of 477 the task-relevant delay-tuned cells in primate prefrontal cortex 26 . Such specificity might explain why 478 several studies reported less conclusive effects of NMDA-R antagonists on overall prefrontal firing 479 rates in monkeys 26, 43 . In vitro work has also revealed the excitatory post-synaptic potentials (EPSPs) 480 of prefrontal pyramidal neurons are much more reliant on NMDA-R conductance than parvalbumin 481 interneurons 44 . Other investigators combining neurophysiological recordings with modelling 482 approaches have also concluded that the action of NMDA-R antagonists is primarily upon pyramidal 483 cells 26, 45 . Our present findings, integrating pharmacological manipulation of behaviour with 484 biophysically-based spiking circuit modelling, suggest that the ketamine-induced behavioural biases 485 are more consistent with a lowering of excitation-inhibition balance. Future work with 486 electrophysiological recordings during the performance of our task, under pharmacological 487
interventions, can potentially dissociate the effect of ketamine on E/I balance specifically in cortical 488 neurons exhibiting decision-related signals. 489
The minutes-long timescale of the NMDA-R mediated decision-making deficit we observed was also 490 consistent with the psychotomimetic effects of subanaesthetic doses of ketamine in healthy 491 humans 7,11 . As NMDA-R hypofunction is hypothesised to play a role in the pathophysiology of 492 schizophrenia 5,6,10,11 , our findings have important clinical relevance. Previous studies have 493 demonstrated impaired perceptual discrimination in patients with schizophrenia performing the 494 random-dot motion (RDM) decision-making task [15] [16] [17] . Although the RDM has predominantly been used 495
to study evidence accumulation 13 , previously this performance deficit in schizophrenia was interpreted 496
as reflecting a diminished representation of sensory evidence in visual cortex 15,18 . Based on our task 497 with precise temporal control of the stimuli, our findings suggest that NMDA-R antagonism alters the 498 decision-making process in association cortical circuits. Dysfunction in these association circuits may 499 therefore provide an important contribution to cognitive deficits -one that is potentially complementary 500 to upstream sensory impairment. Crucially, our task uniquely allowed us to rigorously verify that the 501 subjects used an accumulation strategy to guide their choices (cf. previous animal studies 13, 14, [46] [47] [48] ), 502
with these analyses suggesting the strategy our subjects employed was consistent with findings in 503 human participants. This consistency further ensures our findings may translate across species, in 504 particular to clinical populations. 505 506
Another related line of schizophrenia research has shown a decision-making bias known as jumping 507
to conclusions (JTC) 49, 50 . The JTC has predominately been demonstrated in the 'beads task', a 508 paradigm where participants are shown two jars of beads, one mostly pink and the other mostly green 509
(typically 85%). The jars are hidden, and the participants are presented a sequence of beads drawn 510 from a single jar. Following each draw, they are asked if they are ready to commit to a decision about 511 which jar the beads are being drawn from. Patients with schizophrenia typically make decisions based 512 on fewer beads than controls. Importantly, this JTC bias has been proposed as a mechanism for 513 delusion formation. Based on the JTC literature, one plausible hypothesis for behavioural alteration 514 under NMDA-R antagonism in our task may be a strong increase in the primacy bias, whereby only 515 the initially presented bar samples would be used to guide the subjects' decisions. However, following 516 ketamine administration, we did not observe a strong primacy -instead all samples received roughly 517 the same weighting. There are important differences between our task and the beads task. In our 518 task, the stimulus presentation is shorter (2 seconds, compared to slower sampling across bead 519 draws), and is of fixed duration rather than terminated by the subject's choice, and therefore may not 520 involve the perceived sampling cost of the beads task 51 . 521
Our precise experimental paradigm and complementary modelling approach allowed us to 522 meticulously quantify how monkeys weight time-varying evidence and robustly dissociate sensory and 523 decision-making deficits -unlike prior studies using the RDM and beads tasks. Our approach can be 524 readily applied to experimental and clinical studies to yield insights into the nature of cognitive deficits 525
and Subjects were trained to perform a two-alternative value-based decision-making task. A series of 567 bars, each with different heights, were presented on the left and right-side of the computer monitor. 568
Following a post-stimulus delay, subjects were rewarded for saccading towards the side with either 569 the higher or lower average bar-height, depending upon a contextual cue displayed at the start of the 570 trial (see Fig1a inset). The number of pairs of bars in each series was either four 571 ('ShortSampleTrial') or eight ('LongSampleTrial') during trials in each standard behavioural 572 session. In this report, we only consider the results from the eight sample trials, though similar 573 results were obtained from the four sample trials. The number of bars was always six during 574 pharmacological sessions. 575 576
The bars were presented inside of fixed-height rectangular placeholders (width, 84px; height, 318px). 577
The placeholders had a black border (thickness 9px), and a grey centre where the stimuli were 578 presented (width, 66px; height, 300px). The bar heights could take discrete percentiles, occupying 579 between 1% and 99% of the grey space. The height of the bar was indicated by a horizontal black line 580 (thickness 6px). Beneath the black line, there was 45° grey gabor shading. 581 582
An overview of the trial timings is outlined in Fig1a. Subjects initiated a trial by maintaining their 583 gaze on a central, red fixation point for 750ms. After this fixation was completed, one of four 584 contextual cues (see Fig1a inset) was centrally presented for 350ms. Subjects had previously 585 learned that two of these cues instructed to choose the side with the higher average bar-height 586 ('ChooseHighTrial'), and the other two instructed to choose the side with the lower average bar-587 height ('ChooseLowTrial'). Next, two black masks (width, 84px; height, 318px) were presented for 588
200ms in the location of the forthcoming bar stimuli. These were positioned either side of the fixation 589 spot (6° visual angle from centre). Each bar stimulus was presented for 200ms, followed by a 50ms 590
inter-stimulus-interval where only the fixation point remained on the screen. Once all of the bar stimuli 591 had been presented, the mask stimuli returned for a further 200ms. There was then a post stimulus 592 delay (250-750ms, uniformly sampled across trials). Following this, the colour of the fixation point was 593 changed to green (go cue), and two circular saccade targets appeared on each side of the screen 594
where the bars had previously been presented. This cued the subject to indicate their choice by 595
making a saccade to one of the targets. Once the subject reported their decision, there were two 596 stages of feedback. Immediately following choice, the green go cue was extinguished, the contextual 597
cue was re-presented centrally, along with the average bar heights of the two series of stimuli 598 previously presented. The option the subject chose was indicated by a purple outline surrounding the 599 relevant bar placeholder (width, 3.8°; height, 10°). Following 500ms, the second stage of feedback 600
began. The correct answer was indicated by a white outline surrounding the bar placeholder (width, 601 5.7°; height, 15°). On correct trials, the subject was rewarded for a length of time proportional to the 602 average height of the chosen option (directly proportional on a 'ChooseHighTrial', negatively 603
proportional on a 'ChooseLowTrial'). On incorrect trials, there was no reward. Regardless of the 604 reward amount, the second feedback stage lasted 1200ms. This was followed by an inter-trial-interval 605
(1.946+/-0.051 secs; for Standard Session, across all completed included trials). The inter-trial-606
interval duration was longer on 'ShortSampleTrials' than 'LongSampleTrials', in order for the trials 607
to be an equal duration, and facilitate a similar reward rate between the two conditions. 608 609
Subjects were required to maintain central fixation from the fixation period until they indicated their 610
choice. If the initial fixation period was not completed, or fixation was subsequently broken, the 611 trial was aborted and the subject received a 3000ms timeout (Trials in standard sessions: Monkey 612
A -22.46%, Monkey H -15.27%). On the following trial, the experimental condition was not 613
repeated. If subjects failed to indicate their choice within 8000ms, a 5000ms timeout was initiated 614
(Trials in standard sessions: Monkey A -0%, Monkey H -0%). 615 616
Experimental conditions were blocked according to the contextual cue and evidence length. This 617 produced four block types (ChooseHighShortSampleTrial (H4), ChooseHighLongSampleTrial (H8), 618
ChooseLowShortSampleTrial (L4), ChooseLowLongSampleTrial (L8)). At the start of each 619 session, subjects performed a short block of memory-guided saccades (MGS) 61 , completing 10 620 trials. Data from these trials is not presented in this report. Following the MGS block, the first block 621 of decision-making trials was selected at random. After the subject completed 15 trials in a block, 622 a new block was selected without replacement. Each new block had to have either the same 623 evidence length or the same contextual cue as the previous block. After all four blocks had been 624 completed, there was another interval of MGS trials. A new evidence accumulation start block was 625 then randomly selected. As there were four block types, and either the evidence length or the 626 contextual cue had to be preserved across a block switch, there were two 'sequences' in which the 627 blocks could transition (i.e. H4→H8→L8→L4; or H4→L4→L8→H8, if starting from H4). Following 628 the intervening MGS trials, the blocks transitioned in the opposite sequence to those used 629 previously, starting from the new randomly chosen block. This block switching protocol was 630 continued throughout the session. At the start of each block, the background of the screen was 631 changed for 5000ms to indicate the evidence length of the forthcoming block. A burgundy colour 632 indicated an 8 sample block was beginning, a teal colour indicated a 4 sample block was 633 beginning. 634
Trial Generation
635
The heights of the bars on each trial were precisely controlled. On the majority of trials (Regular 636
Trials, Completed trials in standard sessions: Monkey A -76.67%, Monkey H -76.23%), the 637 heights of each option were generated from independent Gaussian distributions (Fig4a, b) . There 638
were two levels of variance for the distributions, designated as 'Narrow' and 'Broad'. The mean of 639 each distribution, μ, was calculated as μ = 50 + Z*σ, where Z ∼ (-0.25,0.25), and σ was either 12 or 640 24 for narrow and broad stimuli streams. The individual bar heights were then determined by ∼ (μ, 641 σ). The trial generation process was constrained so the samples reasonably reflected the generative 642 parameters. These restrictions required bar heights to range from 1 to 99, and the actual σ for each 643 stream to be no more than 4 from the generative value. On any given trial, subjects could be 644 presented with two narrow streams, two broad streams, or one of each. The evidence variability was 645 therefore independent between the two streams. For post-hoc analysis (Fig4) we defined one stream 646 as the 'Lower SD' option on each trial, and the other the 'Higher SD' option, based upon the 647 sampled/actual σ. 648 A proportion of 'irrationality trials' were also specifically designed to elucidate the effects of evidence 649 variability on choice, and whether subjects displayed primacy/recency biases 20 . These trials occurred 650
in equal proportions within all four block types. Only one of these irrationality trial types was tested in 651 each behavioural session. 652 Narrow-broad trials (Completed trials in standard sessions: Monkey A -14.87%, Monkey H -653 15.78%) probed the effect of evidence variability on choice 20 . Within this category of trials, there were 654 three conditions (Fig3a) . In each, the bar heights of one alternative were associated with a narrow 655
Gaussian distribution (∼ (μ N , 12)), and the bar heights from the other with a broad Gaussian 656 distribution (∼ (μ B , 24) ). In the first two conditions, 'Narrow Correct' (μ N ∼ (48, 60) , μ B = μ N -8) and 657 'Broad Correct' (μ B ∼ (48, 60) , μ N = μ B -8), there was a clear correct answer. In the third condition, 658
'Ambiguous' (μ B ∼ (44, 56) , μ N = μ B ), there was only small evidence in favour of the correct answer. 659
In all of these conditions, the generated samples had to be within 4 of the generating σ. Furthermore, 660
on 'Narrow Correct' and 'Broad Correct' trials the difference between the mean evidence of the 661 intended correct and incorrect stream had to range from +2 to +14. On the 'Ambiguous' trials, the 662 mean evidence in favour of one option over the other was constrained to be <4. A visualisation of the 663 net evidence in each of these trial types is displayed (Fig3a) . For the purposes of illustration, the 664 probability density was smoothed by a sliding window of ±1, within the generating constraints 665 described above ('Narrow Correct' and 'Broad Correct' trials have net evidence for correct option 666 within [2, 14] ; 'Ambiguous' trials have net evidence within [-4, 4] ). A very small number of trials were 667 excluded from this visualisation, because their net evidence fell marginally outside the constraints. 668
This was because bar heights were rounded to the nearest integer (due to the limited number of 669 pixels on the computer monitor) after the generating procedure and the plot reflects the presented bar 670
heights. 671
Half-half trials (Completed trials in standard sessions: Monkey A -8.46%, Monkey H -8.00%) 672
probed the effect of temporal weighting biases on choice 20 . The heights of each option were 673 generated using the same Gaussian distribution (X∼ (μ HH , 12), where μ HH ∼ (40, 60)). This 674 distribution was truncated to form two distributions: X High {mean(X)-0.5*SD(X),∞}, and X Low {-∞, 675 mean(X)+ 0.5*SD(X)}. On each trial, one option was designated 'HighFirst' -where the first half of bar 676 heights was drawn from X High and the second half of bar heights drawn from X Low. This process was 677 also constrained so that the mean of samples drawn from X High had to be at least 7.5 greater than 678 those taken from X Low. The other option was 'LowFirst', where the samples were drawn from the two 679 distributions in the reverse order. 680 681
Task Modifications for Pharmacological Sessions
683
Minor adjustments were made to the task during the pharmacological sessions to maximise trial 684 counts available for statistical analysis. Trial length was fixed to 6 pairs of samples. The block was 685 switched between 'ChooseHigh6Sample' and 'ChooseLow6Sample' after 30 completed trials, without 686
intervening MGS trials. From our pilot data, it was clear ketamine reduced choice accuracy. In order 687
to maintain subject motivation, the most difficult 'Regular' and 'HalfHalf' trials were not presented. 688
Following the trial generation procedures described above, in pharmacological sessions these trials 689
were additionally required to have >4 mean difference in evidence strength. Of the 'Narrow-Broad' 690 trials, only 'Ambiguous' conditions were used; but no further constraints were applied to these trials. In 691 some sessions, a small number of control trials were used, in which the bar heights for each option 692
were fixed across all of the samples. All analyses utilised 'Regular', 'Half-Half', and 'Narrow-Broad' 693 trials. Monkey H did not always complete sufficient trials once ketamine was administered. Sessions 694
where the number of completed trials was fewer than the minimum recorded in the saline sessions 695
were discarded (6 of 18 sessions). Following ketamine administration, Monkey A did not complete 696 fewer trials in any session than the minimum recorded in a saline session. 697
Behavioural Data Analysis
699
To assess decision-making accuracy during standard sessions, we initially fitted a psychometric 700 function 14,29 to subjects' choices pooled across 'Regular' and 'Narrow-Broad' trials (Fig2a, b) . This 701 defines the choice accuracy ( ) as a function of the difference in mean evidence in favour of the 702 correct choice (evidence strength, ): 703
where α and β are respectively the discrimination threshold and order of the psychometric function, 705
and is the exponential function. To illustrate the effect of pro-variance bias, we also fitted a three-706
parameter psychometric function to the subjects' probability to choose the higher SD option ( ) in 707 the 'Regular' trials, as a function of the difference in mean evidence in favour of the higher SD option 708 on each trial ( ): 709
where is the psychometric function shift, and returns 1 and -1 for positive and negative inputs 711 respectively. 712
In both cases, the psychometric function is fitted using the method of maximum-likelihood estimation 713
(MLE), with the estimator 714 option is chosen in trial and 0 otherwise. 717
The temporal weights of stimuli were calculated using logistic regression. This function defined the 718 probability (P L ) of choosing the left option: 719
where is a bias term, reflects the weighting given to the nth pair of stimuli, and reflect the 721 evidence for the left and right option at each time point. 722
Regression analysis was used to probe the influence of evidence mean, and evidence variability on 723 choice during the 'Regular' trials (Fig4d, 5f, 6c, 7f-h, 8d-f, Supp2d,g, Supp6c,h) . This function 724 defined the probability (P L ) of choosing the left option: 725 contribution of regressors other than evidence mean and standard deviation to the decision making 742 process (FigSupp 2e,h, Supp 3b, Supp 4b, Supp 5b, Supp 6d,i) . 743
The goodness-of-fit of various regression models with combinations of the predictors in the full model 744 (equation 6) were compared using a 10-fold cross-validation procedure (Supplementary Tables 1-4) .
745
Trials were initially divided into 10 groups. Data from 9 of the groups was used to train each 746 regression model and calculate regression coefficients. The likelihood of the subjects' choices in the 747 left-out group (testing group), given the regression coefficients, could then be determined. The log-748 likelihood was then summed across these left-out trials. This process was repeated so that each of 749 the 10 groups acted as the testing group. The whole cross-validation procedure was performed 100 750 times, and the average log-likelihood values were taken. 751
To initially explore the time course of drug effects on decision-making, we plotted choice accuracy 752 (combined across 'Regular', 'Half-Half' and 'Narrow-Broad' trials) relative to drug administration 753 (Fig8a). Trials were binned relative to the time of injection. Within each session, choice accuracy was 754 estimated at every minute, using a 6-minute window around the bin centre. Accuracy was then 755 averaged across sessions. To further probe the influence of drug administration on decision-making, 756
we defined an analysis window based upon the time course of behavioural effects. All trials before the 757 time of injection were classified as 'pre-drug'. All trials beginning 5-30 minutes after injection were 758 defined as 'on-drug' trials. These trials were then analysed using the same methods as described for 759
the Standard sessions. 760
To quantify the effect of ketamine administration on the PVB index (Fig 8f, FigSupp 6c,h) , we 761 performed a permutation test. Trials collected during ketamine administration were compared with 762 those collected during saline administration. The test statistic was calculated as the difference 763 between the PVB index in ketamine and saline conditions. For each permutation, trials from the two 764 sets of data were pooled together, before two shuffled sets with the same number of trials as the 765 original ketamine and saline data were extracted. Next, the PVB index was computed in each 766 permuted set, and the difference between the two PVB indices calculated. The difference measure for 767 each permutation was used to build a null distribution with 1000000 entries. The difference measure 768 from the true data was compared with the null distribution to calculate a p-value. 769
Spiking Circuit Model
771
A biophysically-based spiking circuit model was used to replicate decision making dynamics in a local 772 association cortical microcircuit. The model was based on 21 , but with minor modifications from a 773 previous study 34 . The current model had one extra change in the input representation of the stimulus, 774 described in detail below. 775
The circuit model consisted of = 1600 excitatory pyramidal neurons and = 400 inhibitory 776 interneurons, all simulated as leaky integrate-and-fire neurons. All neurons were recurrently 777 connected to each other, with NMDA and AMPA conductances mediating excitatory connections, and 778 GABA A conductances mediating inhibitory connections. All neurons also received background inputs, 779 while selective groups of excitatory neurons (see below) received stimulus inputs. Both background 780 and stimulus inputs were mediated by AMPA conductances with Poisson spike trains. 781
Within the population of excitatory neurons were two non-overlapping groups of size , = 240. 782
Neurons within the two groups received separate inputs reflecting the left and right stimuli streams. 783
Neurons in the same group preferentially connected to each other (with a multiplicative factor > 1 784 to the connection strength), allowing integration of the stimulus input. The connection strength to any 785 other excitatory neurons was reduced by a factor < 1 in a manner which preserved the total 786 connection strength. Due to lateral inhibition mediated by interneurons, excitatory neurons in the two 787 different groups competed with each other. Inhibitory neurons, as well as excitatory neurons not in the 788 two groups, were insensitive to the presented stimuli and were non-selective toward either choices or 789 the respective neuron groups. 790
Momentary stimuli bar evidences were modelled as Poisson inputs (from an upstream sensory area) 791
to the two groups of excitatory neurons (Fig5a) . The mean rate of Poisson input for any group, , 792 linearly scaled with the corresponding stimulus evidence: 793 = + (ℎ − 50) ( 7 ) 794 where ℎ ∈ 0,100 represented the momentary stimulus evidence, equal to the bar height in 795
ChooseHigh trials, and 100 minus bar height in ChooseLow trials. = 30 was the input strength 796
when ℎ = 50, and = 1 . For simplicity, we assumed each bar stimulus lasted 250ms, rather than 797
200ms with a subsequent 50ms inter-stimuli interval as in the experiment. 798
The circuit model simulation outputs spike data for the two excitatory populations, which are then 799 converted to population activity smoothened with a 0.001s time-step via a casual exponential filter. In 800 particular, for each spike of a given neuron, the histogram-bins corresponding to times before that 801 spike receives no weight, while the histogram-bins corresponding to times after the spike receives a 802 weight of filter exp filter , where Δ is the time of the histogram-bin after the spike, and filter =20ms. 803
From the population activity of the two excitatory populations, a choice is selected 2s after stimulus 804 offset, based on the population with higher activity. Stimulus inputs in general drive categorical, 805
winner-take-all competitions such that the winning population will ramp up its activity until a high 806 attractor state (>30Hz, in comparison to approximately 1.5Hz baseline firing rate), while suppressing 807 the activity of the other population below baseline via lateral inhibition (Fig5b). It is also possible that 808 neither population reaches the high-activity state. Both populations, remaining at the spontaneous 809 state, will have similarly low activities, such that the decision readout is random. 810
In addition to the control model, three perturbed spiking circuit models were considered 25,34 : lowered 811 E/I balance, elevated E/I balance, and sensory deficit. E/I perturbations were implemented through 812 hypofunction of NDMARs (Fig7a), as this is a leading hypothesis in the pathophysiology of 813 schizophrenia 4,5,10 . NMDA-R antagonists such as ketamine also provide a leading pharmacological 814 model of schizophrenia 7,11 . NMDA-R hypofunction on excitatory neurons (reduced → ) resulted in 815 lowered E/I ratio, whereas NMDA-R hypofunction on interneurons (reduced → ) resulted in elevated 816 E/I ratio due to disinhibition 34 . Sensory deficit was implemented as weakened scaling of external 817 inputs to stimuli evidence, resulting in reduced ′ . For the exact parameters, the lowered E/I model 818
reduced → by 1.75%, the elevated E/I model reduced → by 3.5%, and the sensory deficit model 819 had ′ = 0.74 . 820
Each of the four circuit models completed 94,000 'Regular' trials, where both streams are narrow in 821 25% of the trials, both streams are broad in 25% of the trials, and one stream is narrow and one is 822 broad in 50% of the trials. All trials were generated identically as in standard session experiments. 823
The control model also completed 47,000 standard session Narrow-Broad trials. The same 824 permutation test described earlier for comparing PVB index between ketamine and saline conditions 825 was also used to quantify whether various perturbed circuit models have different PVB indices relative 826 to the control model (Fig 7h) . 827
Mean Field Model
830
The current spiking circuit model was mathematically reduced to a mean-field model, as outlined in 62 , 831
in the same manner as from 21 to 22 . The mean-field model consisted of two variables, namely the 832 NMDA-R gating variables of the two groups of excitatory neurons, which represented the integrated 833 evidence for the two choices. Using phase-plane analysis, the mean-field model provided an intuitive 834 explanation for the pro-variance bias (see Fig6) . 835
The mean-field model completed 94,000 standard session 'Regular' trials, in the same manner as the 836 circuit models. 837
Code and Data Availability
839
Stimuli generation and data analysis for the experiment were performed in MATLAB. The spiking 840 circuit model was implemented using the Python-based Brian2 neural simulator 63 , with a simulations 841 time step of 0.02ms. Further analyses for both experimental and model data were completed using 842 custom-written Python and MATLAB codes. All codes are available from the authors upon reasonable 843 request. 844 845 846
